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vised in 1987. The PCI presents itself as a highly dynamic initi-
ative that interacts and changes with the demands of the ever-
changing global economy. It is worth emphasising here that the
PCI has teeth. Amid the height of Enron-style scandal in the US
CalPERS ‘announced that it was going to pull out of all its in-
vestments in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines
mainly because of concerns about social conditions in these
countries’ (Blackburn 2003: 516; Greider 2005). 
CalPERS AND THE PCI
The economic power behind the 3 largest public sector pen-
sion funds in the United States are evident by their vast hol-
dings: CalPERS manages over 182 billion Dollar of assets (Cal-
PERS 2005b), the California State Teachers Retirement System,
the country’s second largest fund, holds another 125 billion Dol-
lar in assets, whilst the third largest, New York State Common
Retirement Fund, represents 121 billion Dollar in assets (Grei-
der 2005). While the majority of CalPERS’ assets are invested
on a long-term basis in US corporations, the fund does hold in-
vestments in emerging markets.
In February 2005, for instance, the fund held $3.9 billion in
assets in emerging markets. This trend will persist, as the role
of emerging markets vis-à-vis production facilities and consu-
mer markets continue to flourish (World Bank 2005a+b) (2). The
surge of foreign financial flows to the ‘emerging markets’ also
coincided with the low interest rates in the G-7 countries during
the early 1990s, which was brought about by one of the deepest
recessionary environments in post-war period, outweighed of-
ficial development assistance (see Table 1).
Table 1: Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1990-2004 
Öffentliche Pensionsfonds sind eine Marktkraft,
mit der Regierungen und Firmen rechnen 
müssen. Einer der Hauptvertreter von Share-
holder-Verantwortung hat versucht, bei Investi-
tionen Umwelt-, soziale und finanzielle Aspekte 
zu balancieren. 
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Responsibility for the developing world?
The particular feature of public pension funds, their mem-bership base being comprised of public-sector labour unions,
has facilitated an active relationship between its shareowners
(labour) and corporate executives through the promotion of good
corporate governance principles in the United States (Ghilar-
ducci 2004; Hawley/Williams 2000; Hebb 2001; Blackburn 2003)
(1). Unlike private pension funds, CalPERS has attempted to ba-
lance social including environmental and financial issues vis-à-
vis its investment decisions and strategies. 
California Treasurer and CalPERS Board Member, Phil An-
gelides, argues that ‘enduring value’ should act a guiding prin-
ciple for investments as opposed to short-term economic thin-
king. By this Angelides means ‘that the current laissez-faire,
let-’er-rip system damages important social values – equitable
treatment of workers, the environment and other commonly
shared public assets – and that both workers and retirees (and
the state taxpayers who put up the money for public pension
funds) have a strong self-interest in husbanding the distant fu-
ture: a healthy society and strong economy for themselves and
their families’ (Greider 2005).
Extended understanding of 
corporate governance
By emphasising socially responsible investing practices, Cal-
PERS employs an extended understanding of corporate gover-
nance that transcends the short-term oriented behaviour and
narrowly defined confines of pure fiduciary responsibilities ai-
med at ensuring that corporate management and the Board of
Directors work toward the Anglo-American principle of maxi-
mising shareholder value (Lazonick/O’Sullivan 2000; OECD
2004; Soederberg 2004a). 
CalPERS’ extended view of corporate governance is evident
in its Permissible Country Index (herewith PCI), which was de- Source: World Bank (2005b) 
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It is against this backdrop that the PCI was forged and be-
came an important tool for monitoring performance and en-
hancing value of investments abroad. The Index should be re-
garded as a dynamic document that seeks to be sensitive to
changes and challenges in the global investment environment.
It was not until 1999 in the wake of the East Asian crash of
1997 that the Investment Committee at CalPERS requested
that Wilshire Associates undertake ‘a complete review of the
analysis and looked to expand it since more information regar-
ding countries and markets has become available’ (Wilshire
Consulting 2005: 3). 
In the light of the losses incurred by the Enron and subse-
quent debacles in the US and the ensuing loss of investor con-
fidence, the CalPERS’ Investment Committee sought to fine-
tune the PCI by adding two new features to the Index as well as
a broader treatment of political risk (Wilshire Consulting 2005). 
Measuring ‘Enduring Value’ 
The first country factor of the PCI is political stability, com-
prised of two parts: a macro-factor and several sub-factors. Po-
litical stability, the macro-factor, refers to progress in the crea-
tion of basic democratic institutions and principles, such as
guaranteed elimination of human rights violations, and a strong
and impartial legal system. Political stability is seen as vital com-
ponents in guaranteeing the development of a free market in
the Third World, which in turn will attract and retain long-term
capital. There are several sub-factors that further define politi-
cal stability: civil liberties, independent judiciary and legal pro-
tection, and political risk (Wilshire Consulting 2005). 
It is worth emphasising that the ‘credible independent’ third-
party sources that are used to evaluate these sub-factors is the
Freedom House rankings, which are published on an annual
basis. For the most part, the Freedom House’s findings are gui-
ded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Freedom
House 2005). It should be noted that the same criteria supplied
by the Freedom House is used by President George W. Bush’s
highly controversial ‘global development compact’: the Millen-
nium Challenge Account (cf. Soederberg 2004b). 
Judiciary and legal protection sub-factor
To determine the independent judiciary and legal protec-
tion sub-factor, Wilshire draws on the Contracts and Law Sub-
Index that is published annually in the Global Competitive Re-
port, which is affiliated with the World Economic Forum.
Lastly, for the political risk sub-factor, Wilshire draws on the
risk ranking published in the International Country Risk Gui-
de of a private consultancy firm, PRS Group, which caters to
top Fortune 500 companies. Similar to the other PCI factors,
each of these three sub-factors is scored out of three. The hig-
hest score is three (good) and the lowest is one (poor). For a
country to remain on the investable market list, they must
achieve a passing score of two. 
The second macro-factor is transparency. Wilshire sees this
factor as comprising primarily financial transparency, but inclu-
ding ‘elements of a free press necessary for investors to have
truthful, accurate and relevant information on the conditions in
the countries and companies in which they are investing.’ (2005:
6). The transparency factor includes four sub-factors: freedom
of the press, monetary and fiscal transparency, stock exchange
listing requirements, and accounting standards (2005: 6-7). Pro-
ductive labour practices comprise the third macro-factor. To as-
sist in the evaluation of this macro-factor, Wilshire Consulting
identified a credible third party: Verité is a non-profit research
organization based in Amherst, Massachusetts. 
Role of the International Labour Organisation
As Wilshire states, in the attempts to facilitate of economi-
cally-productive labour practices, markets shall be evaluated ba-
sed on their ratification of and adherence to the principles laid
out by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which ‘co-
ver labour rights and prohibitions on abusive labour practices,
and the degree of effectiveness of implementation through re-
levant laws, enabling regulations and their degree of enforce-
ment through the judiciary process’ (2005: 7). 
The Productive Labour Practices macro-factor is accompa-
nied by the following four sub-factors, which total to a maxi-
mum of 40 points per country: ILO Ratification, Quality of
Enabling Legislation, Institutional Capacity, and effectiveness
of implementation. Moreover, these sub-factors are more he-
avily-weighted toward the quality of enabling legislation and
the effectiveness of implementation (ibid.). Drawing on the
ILO, Wilshire defines the sub-factor of ‘effectiveness of imple-
mentation as: ‘The procedures that exist for enforcement and
monitoring of enforcement of laws in the convention areas and
evidence that exists that these procedures are working effecti-
vely; the existence of a clear grievance process; evidence that
workers and/or unions utilize this grievance process; the ex-
tent to which penalties provided for in the laws are levied; and
the evidence that penalties have deterrence value’ (Wilshire
Consulting 2005: 8). 
For CalPERS, the PCI is a useful rating-system in which to
gauge not only company level adherence to good corporate go-
vernance practices, but also a developing country’s commitment
to ensuring an institutional framework that will support the ,
„The criteria supplied by the 
Freedom House is used by 
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‘proper’ functioning of equity investments. This is an important
point as it reflects the nature of the PCI as a tool to protect wor-
kers’ deferred wages by improving economic efficiency, rather
than radical ideas of social justice aimed at mitigating and/or
reducing harmful effects of economic exploitation rooted in ca-
pital accumulation, such as the low wages, long working days,
and lack of adequate health and social benefits (Altvater/Mahn-
kopf 2002; Harvey 2001).
Relatedly, the reformist nature of the PCI also rests on a key
assumption that the links between economic efficiency and po-
litical democracy are historical and logical trends. Bob Jessop
identifies Milton Friedman, as one of the main proponents of
this assumption. Friedman argues that the typical state of man-
kind is tyranny, servitude, and misery and that the nineteenth
and early twentieth century in the Western world are remarka-
ble exceptions to the general trend that the free market and the
development of capitalist institutions are necessary conditions
for political freedom (cf. Jessop 1983: 275). 
The issue that is neglected in this assumption, as Jessop re-
minds us, is that democracy secures capitalist interests by en-
suring that the working class can be legitimately subjected to
the exploitation of capital – or, ‘[where] exploitation takes the
form of exchange, dictatorship tends to take the form of demo-
cracy’ (1983: 277). CalPERS and the ‘independent’ third parties,
upon whom it draws its expertise, are not alone in sharing this
correlation between political democracy and free market enter-
prise. 
Questionable knowledgebase
Just as the above assumption is neither neutral nor a natu-
ral occurrence, the knowledge base underpinning the PCI must
also be put into question. It is worthwhile highlighting that Wils-
hire Associates do not determine which factors and sub-factors
comprise the PCI; instead, they are determined by the CalPERS
Board of Directors, although the revised PCI was initiated by
both the Treasury Department of California and the former CEO
of CalPERS, Sean Harrigan (3). According to a senior associate
at Wilshire, it is the consultancy firm’s job ‘to find appropriate,
credible independent third-party sources that evaluate the fac-
tors and sub-factors’(4). One needs to recognise that despite
Wilshire’s assertion that ‘credible independent third-party sour-
ces’ are used in the evaluation process of these factors and sub-
factors, knowledge is not an objective abstraction that is devoid
of a material basis. 
As Susan Strange argues, ‘knowledge structures exist which
have the effect of valuing or devaluing different forms of know-
ledge.’ Moreover, a knowledge structure ‘determines what know-
ledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it
by what means to whom and on what terms’ (1988: 115-117). As
mentioned above, in 2002, the year that Wilshire devised the ex-
panded PCI detailed above, CalPERS decided to pull out of all
its investments in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines. However, after intense lobbying by the Philippine go-
vernment and community living in the United States, CalPERS
reversed its decision in May 2002. 
In February 2003, Wilshire Associates, once again, advised
CalPERS to divest from its Philippine holdings. Instead of hee-
ding this advice, CalPERS management devised a ‘cure period’,
which refers to 1 year of grace before CalPERS liquidates its in-
vestments in any emerging market that slips out of public pen-
sion funds’ permissible list. In February 2004, Wilshire once
again advised CalPERS to exit the Philippines, as it did not meet
the criteria set out by the PCI, despite the cure period. 
Enduring Value in the Developing World 
This brief account has sought to provide a broad and criti-
cal overview of CalPERS’ attempt at ethical investment practi-
ces in the Third World. The PCI, despite its limitations, does
contain potential to challenge the increasing power of corpo-
rations and finance over everyday lives in the global North and
South. Although, CalPERS current investments in the develo-
ping world are quite small (3.9 billion Dollars) compared to
over 279 billion Dollars in private capital flows, there are at le-
ast two important global trends, both of which suggest that
struggles for social justice via international investment practi-
ces could gain critical levels of momentum in the near future
(Bose 2005). 
First, the money managed under the PCI initiative repre-
sents part of a larger ethical fund industry, which generates
approximately 2.4 trillion Dollars, indicates that many inves-
tors and savers are beginning to feel more sympathetic to the
critiques against neoliberal-led globalisation and they are able
to back up these sentiments with money. Second, at the inter-
national level, workers’ deferred wages amount to approxima-
tely 13 trillion Dollars (Guinan 2003). However, before Cal-
PERS could act as the model ethical investor, it should move
toward a more radical approach in ensuring social accounta-
bility that rests on more critical understanding of the role of
capital accumulation in the Third World, as well as the advan-
ced industrialised countries. 
„PCI is a tool to protect workers’
deferred wages by improving 
economic efficiency, rather than 
radical ideas of social justice aimed
at mitigating harmful effects 
of economic exploitation rooted
in capital accumulation.“
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